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Using a single-period model,  the impacts  of deposit  insurance  and 
forbearance  on  the costs and  value of  uninsured deposits and  equity capital 
are  shown  under  three regimes:  with only uninsured deposits,  with both insured 
and  uninsured deposits,  and  with both insured and  uninsured  deposits with 
forbearance  to  uninsured depositors in some  states of the  world.  Underpricing 
of  deposit insurance  and  forbearance  policies to  uninsured  depositors  increase 
the value of the uninsured  deposits.  Under  certain conditions,  underpriced 
deposit insurance  increases  the value of equity. 
This paper  was  presented at the Federal  Reserve  System Committee  Meeting on 
Banking and  Financial  Structure in  Miami,  Fla.,  in  November  1987. 
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I. Introduction 
Research  in  the area of  deposit insurance and  capital regulation has  focused 
on  four basic areas:  deposit insurance pricing (Ronn  and  Verma  C19861,  Marcus 
and  Shaked  C19841,  and  Pennacchi  C19871);  capital regulation and  portfolio 
choice  (Koehn  and  Santomero  C19801,  Santomero and  Watson  119771,  and  Chen  and 
Lam  C19851);  implicit deposit guarantees  and  capital forbearance  (Kane  119861, 
Pyl  e  C1  9861,  Penati  and  Protopapadaki  s  C1  9861,  and  Thomson  C1  987a,  1987bl) ; 
and  deposit insurance and  bank  regulation (Kareken  and  Wallace  l19781,  Buser, 
Chen,  and  Kane  C19811,  and  Benston,  Eisenbeis,  Horvitz,  Kane,  and  Kaufman 
C19861).  This study examines  the impacts  of deposit insurance  guarantees  and 
forbearances  on  the cost of capital for banks. 
The  models  used  in  the paper  are the single-period and  multiperiod capital 
asset pricing models  (CAPM)  similar to  the ones  used  by Chen  (1978).  Within 
this framework  we  show  the relative values of  depositor and  stockholder 
positions in  the bank  under  three different deposit-insurance regimes.  Under 
the first  regime,  we  assume  that no deposits are insured.  Under  the second 
regime,  we  allow for explicit deposit guarantees  but no implicit guarantees. 
Finally,  under  the third regime,  we  have  both insured and  uninsured deposits 
and  allow for the guarantee of the uninsured deposits in  some  of  the failure 
states.  Furthermore,  we  examine  the effects of  mispriced deposit guarantees 
in  regimes  two and  three. 
The  costs of equity capital and  uninsured deposits  are explored under  each 
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If  the deposit guarantees  are correctly priced,  then under  regime  two  the 
costs of uninsured  deposits  and  equity capital are invariant to the deposit 
mix.  This result does  not hold up if the insurance  is  mispriced.  Under 
regime  three,  the cost of  uninsured deposits  is a function  of the forbearance 
policy of the deposit guarantor.  In  this case,  the costs of  debt  and  equity 
capital are not invariant to the deposit mix  even  when  the explicit guarantee 
is  priced correctly. 
In  section 11,  we  present the single-period results for each  regime.  In 
section 111,  we  compare  the value and  cost of  uninsured  deposits and  equity 
across  the  three regimes  to  see  the effects of  deposit  insurance mispricing 
and  forbearance policy.  In section IV,  we  present  the multiperiod version for 
the third regime.  Finally,  in  section V,  we  provide our  conclusions. 
11.  The  Cost of Capital  for Banks  in  Static Models 
To  determine  the effects of  mispriced deposit insurance and  FDIC  forbearance 
policy on  the cost of debt  (deposit)  capital and  equity capital for  banks,  we 
utilize the single-period CAPM  valuation equation used  by Chen  (1978)  and 
derived by Sharpe  (19641,  Linter (19651,  and  Mossin (1966).  The  key 
assumptions  underlying this model  are:  (1)  a fixed,  risk-free rate of 
interest,  (2)  perfectly competitive capital markets,  (3) homogeneous 
expectations with respect to the distributions and  expected yields on risky 
assets,  and  (4)  risk-averse investors who  seek  to  maximize  the expected 
utility  of terminal  wealth.  The  following notation is  used  in  this section: 
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K  =  Total  promised payment when some deposits are insured  (= Bi+B,+z> 
B  I  =  Total  promised payment to insured depositors 
B  ,  =  Total  promised payment to uninsured depositors 
z  =  Total  promised payment to the FDIC (= pBi> 
P  =  Deposit insurance premium per dollar of insured deposits 
YI,  I  =  Value of the end-of-period  cash flows to insured 
depositors 
Yb I,  =  Value of the end-of-period  cash flows to  uninsured 
depositors 
Ye  =  Value of the end-of-period cash flows to stockholders 
Y,,,,  =  Value of the end-of-period  cash flows to the FDIC 
Vb  I  =  Value of  insured deposits 
Vb  u  =  Value of  uninsured deposits 
v  e  =  Value of  bank equity 
V,,  , ,  =  Value of the FDIC claim 
V  F  =  Value of the bank 
E(Rbl>  =  Expected rate of return on insured deposits 
E(Rbu> =  Expected rate of return on uninsured deposits 
E(Re>  =  Expected rate of return on bank equity 
r  =  Risk-free rate of return 
F(X>  =  Cumulative distribution function for X 
CEQ(X>  =  Certainty-equivalent of X, equal  to E(X>  - X COV(X,Rm) 
X  =  The market risk premium 
Rm  =  Return on the market 
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promised payment  to  each  class of depositor  includes both principal repayment 
and  interest. 
Below  we  present  the expected  end-of-period payments  to  deposi tors, 
stockholders,  and  the FDIC  under  three different deposit-insurance regimes. 
Under  all three regimes,  bankruptcy costs  and  taxes are assumed  to  be  zero. 
The  first regime  replicates Chen's  results for the the cost of  debt (deposit) 
capital  and  equity capital when  there is  no  deposit insurance.  In the  second 
regime,  banks  issue both insured and  uninsured deposits.  However,  the FDIC 
does  extend forbearances  to  any  class of creditors or stockholders.  We  build 
in FDIC  forbearance  policy in the third regime. 
A.  Regime I: No  Deposit Insurance 
Banks  issue uninsured deposits only,  and  the end-of-period cash  flows accruing 
to  the depositors,  Yb,  are: 
The  value of the deposits,  V,,  is the risk-adjusted discounted value of  Y,. 
The  cost of debt  (deposit)  capital,  or the required rate of return on  the 
deposits,  is  E(R,)  =  E(Yb)/V,. 
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interest rate,  the firm's systematic  risk (as  measured  by  XCOV(X,R,)>,  and 
the probability of bankruptcy  (F(B>>. 
For  the stockholders,  the expected end-of-period cash  flows,  Ye,  equals: 
X-B 
Ye =  I 
0 
and  from the single-period CAPM  valuation equation,  the value of stockholder 
equity,  V,,  equals: 
As  in  the case  of debt  capital,  the cost of  equity capital, or the required 
rate of return on equity,  is  E(Re)  =  Ye/Ve. 
As  in  Chen,  the cost of equity capital for a bank  is a function  of  its 
systematic  risk,  the  level of total promised payment,  the probabi 1  i  ty  of 
bankruptcy,  and  the risk-free interest rate. 
The  value of the firm  is the sum  of the value of all claims  against  the 
firm,  that is, Vf =  Vb +  Ve. 
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In this regime,  we  allow for the explicit insurance of some  of  the bank's 
deposit liabilities.  We  assume  that the FDIC  charges  the bank  a premium of 
p on each  dollar of insured deposits and  that the premium  is  collected at 
the end  of the period.  The  total liability claim against the bank,  K,  is the 
sum  of the end-of-period promised payments  to  the  insured depositors,  B,; 
the uninsured depositors,  B,;  and  the FDIC,  z  =  pB,.  The  effect of 
deposit insurance on  the value  and  cost of  capital  depends  on  whether  the 
guarantees  are underpriced,  fairly priced,  or overpriced.'  However,  in  this 
paper  we  generally assume  that the FDIC  underprices its guarantees  and, 
therefore,  that K  <  D. 
The  end-of-period cash  flows  for  the insured deposits,  Y,,,,  equals  the 
promised payment  to insured depositors,  B,,  in  every  state.  Therefore,  the 
value of the insured deposits  is Vb  ,  =  (l+r)-'B,  and  the required return 
on  the insured deposits  is E(R,,)  =  r.  The  cost of insured deposit capital 
to the bank  is r  +  p. 
For  the uninsured depositors,  the end-of-period cash  flows,  Ydu,  depend 
on  the promised payment  to  the uninsured depositors  and  on  the  total level of 
promised  payments. 
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of  return on  these deposits,  E(Rbu>,  are: 
(1b)  Vbu =  (1+r)-'CBuC1-F(K)I  +  (B,/K)CEQE(X)l,  and 
As  in  the first  regime,  the cost of  debt (uninsured deposit)  capital  is a 
function  of systematic  risk,  total promised  payments,  the probability of 
bankruptcy,  and  the risk-free rate of interest.  However,  the cost of debt 
capital is explicitly a function of the deposit mix  when  the FDIC guarantees 
are mispriced.  That  is, underpriced deposit guarantees  lower  the bankruptcy 
threshold,  F(K>, and  increase  the proportional claim of the uninsured 
depositors relative to the  insured depositors and  the FDIC.  The  degree  to 
which this effect operates  is a function of the FDIC's  pricing error per 
dollar of insured deposits and  of the deposit mix. 
As  in  regime one,  the stockholders'  expected  end-of-period cash  flows are 
earnings  less total promised payments  in  the nonbankruptcy  states,  and  zero in 
the bankruptcy  states.  However,  the total promised payment  and  the 
probability of a bankruptcy  state are now  a function of the deposit mix and  of 
the pricing of the deposit guarantees. 
X-K  X>K 
ye  =  1  if  I 
0  K>X 
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(3b)  V,  =  (1 +  r>-'(CEQ,(X>  - KC1-F(K>I),  and 
As  in  the case  of uninsured deposits,  the cost of  equity capital  is  a 
function  of the deposit insurance pricing and  the deposit mix.  In  other 
words,  the subsidy that arises when  the FDIC  misprices its deposit guarantees 
affects  the cost and  value of debt (uninsured  deposit)  capital  and  equity 
capital  . 
The  FDIC  subsidy can  be  seen  when  we  aggregate  the claims of  the 
debt-holders (insured  and  uninsured)  and  equity-holders in  the firm.  The 
total value of the bank  is: 
The  end-of-period cash  flows and  the value of the FDIC's  position in  the bank 
(the FDIC's  subsidy)  are: 
The  value of the FDIC's  claim is  a  function of the probability of  bankruptcy, 
F(K);  the level of promised payments  to  insured depositors,  Bi  ; the 
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r; and  the insurance premium,  z.  If we  add  (5b)  and  (6b>, the resulting 
equation  is identical  to  equation  (5a)  in the no-insurance regime.  In fact, 
when  VFDIC =  0,  the insurance  is correctly priced and  equation  (5b)  is 
identical  to  equation  (5a). 
C.  Regime  111:  Insured and  Uninsured Deposits  and  FDIC  Forbearances 
We  extend the analysis  to  include  the conditional  guarantee of uninsured 
deposits  in  bankruptcy  states when  earnings,  X,  fall between  S1 and  Sr. 
We  assume  that S,  and  S2 are determined  by  FDIC  policy and  are known  to 
market participants.  For  simplicity, we  model  only one  set of bounds  for FDIC 
bailouts,  but the analysis holds  for multiple and  disjoint bailout states. 
The  position of the insured depositors  is not affected by FDIC  bailout 
policies.  However,  Ydu,  Vdu and  E(Rdu> are all functions of the FDIC 
bai  lout pol  icy. 
The  cost of  debt  (uninsured  deposit)  capital  is now  a function of the 




S2  >  X  >  S1 
S1  >X>O 
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The  value of the FDIC  bailout is entirely captured  by  the uninsured 
depositors and  does  not affect the position of the stockholders.  As  seen 
below,  Ye,  V,,  and  E(Re)  are identical  to  those  in the previous regime. 
However,  as  seen  in  equation (Sc),  the  value of the  firm  is  a function of  the 
FDIC's  bailout policy.  The  last two  terms  on  the right side of (Sc)  reflect 
the net value of the FDIC  forbearances  to  uninsured depositors. 
The  end-of-period cash  flows  to the FDIC  and  the value of the FDIC's  claim on 
the bank  now  include  the cost of guaranteeing  the uninsured deposits  in the 
bai  lout states. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper
Best available copyThe  expected cost of  providing forbearances  to  uninsured depositors  in  the 
bailout states  is  reflected in  the  last two terms on  the right side of 
equation (6~).  As  before,  the sum  of (5c)  and  (6c)  equals  the value of the 
firm  in  5(a). 
111.  The  Effects of Mispriced Insurance  and  Forbearance on  the Cost  and 
Value of  Debt  and  Equity Capital 
As  seen  in  section 11,  mispriced deposit insurance  and  FDIC  forbearances 
affect  the cost of  capital and  the value of debt and  equity shares  in  banks. 
The  presence of  mispriced FDIC  guarantees  and  FDIC  forbearances  has  an  impact 
on  the  value of  uninsured deposits.  The  value of equity is  also affected by 
mispriced deposit guarantees.  In  this section,  we  show  the direction of 
change  in  the value of capital from FDIC  policies. 
The  value of the uninsured deposits  (per  dollar of  promised payment)  is 
increased by  the presence of mispriced deposit insurance.  To  demonstrate  this, 
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By  subtracting Y,,/B  from YbU/Bu, we  can  split the uninsured deposit in 
regime  two  into two instruments:  one  that is identical to  the uninsured 
deposit in  regime one,  and  a second  that has  the following payoffs next period. 
If the value of AgYbu is  positive (negative),  then stochastic dominance 
requires that the value of  an  uninsured deposit (with a par value of  one 
dollar)  in  regime  two must  be  greater (less)  than its value in  regime  one. 
In  equation  (7),  AgVbu  is the value of the income  stream that accrues  to 
uninsured depositors when  the FDIC  underprices  its deposit guarantees.  The 
first term on  the right side  is  positive,  the second  term is negative,  and  the 
third term  is  positive when  deposit guarantees  are underpriced.  y  equals 
1lK minus  lIB,  which  is  positive because  K <  B. 
From  the bankruptcy  condition in  regime  one,  we  know  that B[F(B)  -  F(K)I  > 
EE(X>  >  CEQE(X),  and  that F(B> -  F(K)  >  (l/B)CEQF(X).  Therefore,  equation  (7) 
is positive,  and  the value of the uninsured deposits  increases  when  deposit 
insurance  is underpriced.  AgVb,,Bu  can  be  interpreted as  the value of 
FDIC  subsidies  accruing to  uninsured depositors from underpriced deposit 
guarantees. 
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increases  the value of uninsured  deposits  (per  do1 lar of  promised  payment). 
Following the procedure used  in the previous  case,  we  separate  an  uninsured 
deposit  in  regime  three into two  instruments:  one  that is identical  to  an 
uninsured deposit  in  regime  two,  and  a second  that has  the following 
end-of-period payoffs: 
The  value of  AFYbu is: 
A  sufficient condition for equation  (8)  to  be  positive is  K  2  Sr,  which 
holds  by  definition.  Furthermore,  FDIC  forbearances  represent  a call option, 
which  implies that AFVd,  must  be  nonnegative.  Therefore,  equation  (8) 
is  positive,  and  the extension of forbearance to  uninsured depositors in  some 
bankruptcy states increases  the value of those deposits. 
For  the equity-holders,  section  I1  shows  that FDIC  forbearances  to 
uninsured depositors do not affect the value of their shares.  On  the other 
hand,  underpriced deposit  insurance  does  affect the value of  bank  equity.  The 
change  in the payments  to  equity-holders from  regime one  to  regime  two is: 
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identical  to the equity claim in  regime one  and  an  instrument whose  value  is: 
We  know  that E!(X>  >  K[F(B)-F(K>I;  however,  it  is not clear that 
CEQF(X)  >  K[F(B)-F(K>I  because  EF(X)  >  CEQ!(X).  Equation  (9) 
will be  positive if (B-K)[1-F(B)I  - lCov;(X,R,)  2  0,  or if 
(B-K>[l-F(B>I  - xCOV~(X,R,)  <  E!(X)  - KCF(B)-F(K)I.  It  is 
likely that this condition holds  and  that equation  (9)  is  positive. 
Furthermore,  if  paying too little for deposit insurance lowers  a bank's  value, 
the bank  could always  remove  this redistributive effect by  voluntarily 
increasing its  payments  to the FDIC.  Therefore,  equation  (9)  must  be 
nonnegative. 
IV.  TheMultiperiodModel 
We  analyze the multiperiod version of the third regime  discussed above:  the 
bank  issues both insured and  uninsured deposits;  there is  a fixed deposit 
insurance premium  that may  or may  not be  equal  to  the "fair" premium  that 
reduces  to  zero the value of the FDIC's  claim;  and  in states  S, through 
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context,  if the bank  cannot  meet  all of its  obligations from its cash  flow, it 
is able  to  issue equity to  meet  the claims of the depositors.  If the  total of 
cash  flow  and  equity is insufficient to  meet  all claims,  the  total available 
funds  are  split proportionately among  all claimants. 
We  make  several  assumptions  in  addition to  those  stated above  for the 
single-period model.  First, equity is issued to  help meet  promised payments 
as  long as  shareholder  wealth is  positive.  Bankruptcy  can  be  avoided even if 
the terminal  value of the bank  is negative,  as  long as  the total of  the equity 
value and  the net operating income  at least meets  promised payments.  Second, 
in  deriving the expressions  for market  values  and  the implied required rates 
of return below,  we  assume  that the term structure of interest rates  is  flat. 
Third,  we  assume  that the price of  risk is constant over  time.  Fourth,  we 
deal  with a zero-growth bank  and  assume  that the distribution of net operating 
income  is constant over  time.  Finally,  we  assume  that,  ex-ante,  the 
bankruptcy point in future periods  equals  its value  in the first period. 
A1 1  terms  are defined as  above,  except  that we  replace B,  and  Buy the 
total promised payments  due  insured and  uninsured depositors  in  the 
single-period model,  by  D, and  D,,  the principals due  on  deposits.  The 
other portions of the payments  received by  depositors are Id,  and Id",  the 
interest payments  due  insured and  uninsured depositors,  respectively.  The 
wealth of insured  depositors  is equal  to their interest payments  received over 
the period plus  the value of their claims at the end  of the period (Vd,  +,), 
discounted at the risk-free rate of interest, r. 
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Vdi  =  [l/(l+r)I(Idi  +  Vdi  +I). 
By  repeated  substitution,  this leads  to: 
Vdi  =  (l/r)I,,  i 
E(Rdi)  = r. 
Uninsured depositors  will receive only a portion of the  total of earnings 
and  funds  raised through equity issue unless  earnings  and  equity funds  are 
sufficient to  meet  the total of  all claims  (K  =  Id,+Idu+Di+Du+z)  or 
unless  the FDIC  bails out the bank.  The  FDIC  is assumed  to  bail out uninsured 
depositors if bank  earnings fall between  S1 and  Sp. 
The  expected,  or required,  return on  uninsured deposits  is  derived from  the 
condition that Vdu =  E(YdU)/[E(RdU)+F(h)l. 
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them  by  depositors depend  on  the expected value of  equity as  well  as  on  the 
factors  emphasized  in the  single-period model.  The  value of the deposits 
depends  on  the expected value of equity through the default premium,  F(h>, and 
as  it  affects the total funds  available to  be  split among  claimants.  The 
default  premium  enters  the risk-adjusted rate, r  +  F(h),  now  used  to  discount 
cash  flows.  Because  it  is  now  the  total of net operating income  plus expected 
funds  raised through equity issue that will be  split among  claimants,  the 
value of equity directly enters  the expressions  for  the value  and  required 
rate of  return on  uninsured deposits. 
As  usual,  the equity-holders have  a residual  claim: 
The  value and  required rate of return on  equity depend  on  the probability 
of  bankruptcy,  which  is  a  function of the distribution of  net operating income 
plus funds  raised from equity issue at the end  of  the period (Ve  ,[I. 
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the determinants of the value of the FDIC's  claim on  the bank.  Once  again,  a 
fair premium  sets  the value of the claim to  zero. 
V.  Conclusion 
Using the  single-period and multiperiod capital asset pricing model  utilized 
by Chen  (1978),  we  examined  the  impact of mispriced deposit guarantees  and 
FDIC  forbearances on  the rates of  return and  on  the value of  uninsured 
deposits  and  equity capital.  In the absence  of  mispriced FDIC  deposit 
guarantees  and  forbearances,  the cost of  uninsured deposits and  their value 
does  not depend  on  the deposit mix.  However,  when  we  allow for the  insurance 
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a function of both the deposit mix, the degree of mispricing, and FDIC 
forbearance policy.  Similar results hold for the return on equity. 
Furthermore, these policies affect the values of the uninsured deposits 
and equity.  The values of  equity and uninsured deposits both  increase when 
the FDIC underprices its insurance.  The value of  uninsured deposits also 
increases in response to FDIC forbearances.  In addition, we show that the 
values of FDIC guarantees and forbearances are a function of the insured 
bank's systematic risk, its probability of  bankruptcy, and its deposit mix 
(when  the insurance is mispriced).  Finally, we replicate the results of 
section 11,  part C in a multiperiod setting. 
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1)  Fair pricing of deposit insurance guarantees implies that the total  value 
of the firm and the rates of return are the same as in the no-insurance 
case.  The correct value of deposit insurance is a function of the deposit 
mix and the earnings distribution.  However, if  correctly priced, the' 
deposit insurance premium offsets the effects of the shift from "no 
insured deposits" to  "some insured deposits." 
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